TY - GEN
T1 - A co-dependent value-based mechanism for the internet advertisement auction
AU - Takahashi, Satoshi
AU - Matsuo, Tokuro
AU - Ito, Takayuki
AU - Lee, Roger Y.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Advertisements on the webpage provide good opportunity to get new customers. In recent years, a lot of webpages providing a search service have advertisements, which are related with searched word by user. A basic structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Some searching companies, such as Google and Yahoo, employ GSP mechanism basically. There are many researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. It means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, an effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the co-dependent value of advertisement. We analyze the auctioneer’s profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and our proposed mechanism.
AB - Advertisements on the webpage provide good opportunity to get new customers. In recent years, a lot of webpages providing a search service have advertisements, which are related with searched word by user. A basic structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Some searching companies, such as Google and Yahoo, employ GSP mechanism basically. There are many researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. It means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, an effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the co-dependent value of advertisement. We analyze the auctioneer’s profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and our proposed mechanism.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85025680823
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85025680823#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-35612-4_5
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-35612-4_5
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85025680823
SN - 9783642356117
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 64
EP - 77
BT - Agent Based Simulation for a Sustainable Society and Multi-agent Smart Computing - InternationalWorkshops, PRIMA 2011, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Hsu, Jane Yung-Jen
A2 - Governatori, Guido
A2 - Cranefield, Stephen
A2 - Kinny, David
A2 - Ghose, Aditya
A2 - Song, Insu
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 14th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2011
Y2 - 16 November 2011 through 18 November 2011
ER -