TY - CHAP
T1 - A coalition structure-based decision method in B2B E-commerce model with multiple-items
AU - Takahashi, Satoshi
AU - Matsuo, Tokuro
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - This paper proposes a new B2B electronic commerce model by using bidding information in double auctions. In B2B electronic commerce, buyers try to purchase in multiple items at the same time, since a buyer develops something products by using purchased items. Also suppliers have an incentive of making coalitions, since buyers want to purchase in multiple items. A mechanism designer has to consider an optimal mechanism which calculates an optimal matching between buyers and suppliers. But to find an optimal matching is very hard, since a mechanism calculates all combinations between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, we propose a calculation method which has two steps, first a mechanism determines winners of buyers' side, then, determines coalitions and winners of suppliers by using the result of buyers' side. This paper also discusses the improved method with dynamical mechanism design by using the bidding information. The auction protocol trees are expressed by all possible results of auctions. The result of each auction is recorded and stored with bidding data and conditions for subsequent auctions. Advantages of this paper are that each developer can procure the components to develop a certain item and tasks are allocated to suppliers effectively. The previous result of auction data can be available to shorten the period of winner determinations.
AB - This paper proposes a new B2B electronic commerce model by using bidding information in double auctions. In B2B electronic commerce, buyers try to purchase in multiple items at the same time, since a buyer develops something products by using purchased items. Also suppliers have an incentive of making coalitions, since buyers want to purchase in multiple items. A mechanism designer has to consider an optimal mechanism which calculates an optimal matching between buyers and suppliers. But to find an optimal matching is very hard, since a mechanism calculates all combinations between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, we propose a calculation method which has two steps, first a mechanism determines winners of buyers' side, then, determines coalitions and winners of suppliers by using the result of buyers' side. This paper also discusses the improved method with dynamical mechanism design by using the bidding information. The auction protocol trees are expressed by all possible results of auctions. The result of each auction is recorded and stored with bidding data and conditions for subsequent auctions. Advantages of this paper are that each developer can procure the components to develop a certain item and tasks are allocated to suppliers effectively. The previous result of auction data can be available to shorten the period of winner determinations.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/82555189882
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/82555189882#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-24696-8_6
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-24696-8_6
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:82555189882
SN - 9783642246951
T3 - Studies in Computational Intelligence
SP - 99
EP - 109
BT - New Trends in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiations
A2 - Ito, Takayuki
A2 - Zhang, Minjie
A2 - Robu, Valentin
A2 - Fatima, Shaheen
A2 - Matsuo, Tokuro
ER -