A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents

Takayuki Ito; Tokuro Matsuo; Tadachika Ozono; Toramatsu Shintani

doi:10.1007/11504894_25

A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents

Takayuki Ito
, Tokuro Matsuo
, Tadachika Ozono
, Toramatsu Shintani

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. Bidding support agents have been studied very extensively. We envision a future in which many people can trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that people who use a bidding support agent can successively win trades. Also, we prove that the situation in which every people use a bidding support agent can satisfied strategy proofness and Pareto optimality. Further, we present in the situation, unsupported bidders do not make a positive benefit.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	175-184
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Print)	3540265511, 9783540265511
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/11504894_25
Publication status	Published - 2005
Externally published	Yes
Event	18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems: Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence, IEA/AIE 2005 - Bari, Italy Duration: 22-06-2005 → 24-06-2005

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	3533 LNAI
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems: Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence, IEA/AIE 2005
Country/Territory	Italy
City	Bari
Period	22-06-05 → 24-06-05

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/11504894_25

Cite this

Ito, T., Matsuo, T., Ozono, T., & Shintani, T. (2005). A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents. In Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings (pp. 175-184). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3533 LNAI). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11504894_25

Ito, Takayuki ; Matsuo, Tokuro ; Ozono, Tadachika et al. / A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents. Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2005. pp. 175-184 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. Bidding support agents have been studied very extensively. We envision a future in which many people can trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that people who use a bidding support agent can successively win trades. Also, we prove that the situation in which every people use a bidding support agent can satisfied strategy proofness and Pareto optimality. Further, we present in the situation, unsupported bidders do not make a positive benefit.",

author = "Takayuki Ito and Tokuro Matsuo and Tadachika Ozono and Toramatsu Shintani",

year = "2005",

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Ito, T, Matsuo, T, Ozono, T & Shintani, T 2005, A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents. in Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3533 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 175-184, 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems: Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence, IEA/AIE 2005, Bari, Italy, 22-06-05. https://doi.org/10.1007/11504894_25

A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents. / Ito, Takayuki; Matsuo, Tokuro; Ozono, Tadachika et al.
Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2005. p. 175-184 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3533 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. Bidding support agents have been studied very extensively. We envision a future in which many people can trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that people who use a bidding support agent can successively win trades. Also, we prove that the situation in which every people use a bidding support agent can satisfied strategy proofness and Pareto optimality. Further, we present in the situation, unsupported bidders do not make a positive benefit.

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Ito T, Matsuo T, Ozono T, Shintani T. A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents. In Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence - 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, IEA/AIE 2005, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2005. p. 175-184. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/11504894_25

A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents

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